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Key Insights:
• Elder Chinese Communist Party leaders such as Jiang Zemin are
becoming increasingly marginalized, while leaders of the “Fourth Generation” are becoming more prominent.
• The Chinese political system is becoming increasingly institutionalized.
However, this process is not yet complete.
• There is growing separation between Chinese civil and military elites.
• The best way to describe China’s new military leaders is as “Techno-Nationalists”; generals with strong operational and technical backgrounds who
have a great interest in modernizing the People’s Liberation Army.
• Several new concepts in Chinese military thought require further study by
Western researchers.

Over 50 experts in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gathered at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, from September 19-21, to attend the 2003 PLA Conference. Cosponsored by the
U.S. Army War College, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute, the
conference was titled “After the 16th Party Congress: The Civil and the Military.”
The closing of the 16th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and subsequent
personnel appointments saw great change in the civil and military leadership of the PLA. Former

President Jiang Zemin relinquished all of the
Party and State offices he held within the
Chinese Government―save one. He allowed
himself to be re-elected for another term as
Chief the Party’s Central Military Commission
(CMC). By retaining control over the military,
Jiang effectively usurped the Commanderin-Chief powers of the new General Party
Secretary and President, Hu Jintao. This has
lead to uncertainty within China about the
exact military chain of command. Additionally,
military leadership within the CMC has passed
to a new generation of less political, more
practical, generals. This conference addressed
the impact that these personnel and political
changes have had on the PLA.

played out at other levels through the use of
supporters in the younger “Fourth Generation”
of CCP leadership. A good illustration are the
interactions between Premier Wen Jiabao and
Vice-President Zeng Qinghong. Despite being
old friends, Wen is a supporter of Hu Jintao,
while Zeng’s loyalties lie firmly with Jiang
Zemin.
As long as the struggle between the “two
centers” continues, the PLA will have difficulty
in pushing measures it needs to modernize
through the CCP bureaucracy.
New Central Committee and CMC Members.
Other personnel changes within the CMC of
the CCP will affect prospects for modernization
within the PLA. The great personal influence
once wielded by the top levels of the Party
(such as Jiang Zemin) is slowly starting to fade,
replaced by more formal institutional authority
based on position. Many of the new Provincial
Party Secretaries selected at the 16th Party
Congress have been promoted “up through the
ranks” from provincial levels, having started
their careers as local Party functionaries.
Local and provincial politics in China are
conservative, as Party officials try to avoid
upsetting their constituencies. Additionally,
many of the newly appointed Secretaries had
their higher education interrupted by the
upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, giving
them a narrow world view. Looking at these
two factors in combination, it is very likely that
the newly appointed Secretaries have politically
conservative outlooks. This conservatism will
tend to slow political change in China, and
hence limit the speed of PLA modernization.
On the other hand, the newly appointed
generals of the CMC are younger, more
experienced, better educated, and less political
than their predecessors. Four of the six
generals have previous experience working in
Military Region Headquarters, while the other
two focused on China’s military science and
technical research, especially China’s rocket
forces. Several of the generals are veterans
of China’s 1979 conflict with Vietnam and/or
have had experience in PLA exercises directed

The Two Centers.
The PLA is currently caught in the midst
of a succession struggle within the CCP and
finds itself torn between the “two centers” of
power in Chinese politics: CMC Chair Jiang
Zemin and President Hu Jintao. While the PLA
first praised the continued leadership of Jiang
Zemin, articles appeared in official Chinese
military newspapers soon after, criticizing
the strain put on the chain of command by
having “two centers.” President Hu Jintao, for
his part, has been either unable or unwilling
to force a change in the status quo. The PLA
remains caught in the middle. While originally
the army of the CCP, the PLA is in the process
becoming a more modern national army, and
the deadlock between Jiang and Hu hinders
military modernization on several fronts, such
as budget and equipment procurement, in
addition to chain-of-command issues.
In the past year, President Hu Jintao has
attempted to strengthen his position politically.
While not openly disagreeing with Jiang
Zemin, Hu used events such as the SARS crisis
to both bolster his position and garner popular
support. While he has had little apparent
effect on China’s National Security policy to
date, by picking his political battles wisely, Hu
has better positioned himself to affect it in the
future.
The struggle between Jiang and Hu is also
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against Taiwan. They are more than capable
of continuing the PLA along the previously
established path of military modernization.
Whether or not they are capable of dealing
with rapid changes in the international arena
and national security threats facing China is
still unknown.

Conclusions.
The PLA continues to move along the path
of military modernization. However, as it
does, a number of factors affect and influence
the pace at which this happens. Currently,
the following factors are working to slow
modernization within the PLA.
The first is China’s perception of military
threats against it. From the Chinese point
of view, one of the major aims of military
modernization is to be able to deter, or defeat
if necessary, U.S. use of force in support of
Taiwan. As long as Sino-U.S. tensions over
Taiwan remain in the background, the Chinese
military will have little need to speed up its
military modernization.
A second influence comes from the Chinese
economy.
As China’s economy grows,
government tax receipts increase, providing
more money for the PLA to modernize. Were
the growth in the Chinese economy to drop
from its current pace, so too would the money
available to the PLA to improve or replace
old weapons systems. Additionally, Chinese
leaders since Deng Xiaoping have emphasized
economic
development
over
military
modernization, pointing more budgetary
resources in that direction.
Political maneuvering within the civilian
leadership as well as PLA-CCP differences
over the aim of military modernization also act
as drags on the pace of military modernization.
The PLA currently doesn’t have a unified chain
of command, with no one person in charge of
both the party and the army. This has increased
tensions both within the CCP and between the
civilian and military members of the CMC, and
hampered communication between the two
establishments. Under these circumstances,
rapid military modernization by the PLA is
unlikely.

A New Old Concept in Chinese Military
Thinking?
As China’s military continues to modernize,
new concepts and currents in Chinese military
thinking will appear. A possible example of
this is the term Sha Shou Jian (Assassin’s Mace).
A venerable Chinese proverb, Assassin’s Mace
is used to indicate a secret weapon or method
used by a person or group to triumph over a
stronger adversary. However, use of the term
has increased in Chinese military papers since
the late 1990s. Does this indicate an attempt
by PLA strategists to “think outside the box”
of ways of defeating a superior military force
or is it a reference to a specific weapon or
program within the Chinese military? The
answer is possibly both. In low-level PLA
literature, Assassin’s Mace seems to refer to
unconventional tactics, asymmetrical warfare,
and even “miracle weapons” that could be
used to negate the combat and technological
advantages of a stronger adversary (generally
assumed to be the United States). At the same
time, several pronouncements by high-level
PLA and Party leaders indicate that concrete
Assassin’s Mace weapons development
programs exist. While the appearance of a
“wonder weapon” on the battlefield could
in fact give China a tactical advantage, the
possibility that Chinese leaders, believing their
Assassin’s Mace would give them a sudden
victory over the United States, would be
more willing risk military action is even more
worrisome. Terms such as Assassin’s Mace,
that indicate possible shifts in Chinese military
thinking, bear closer watching by experts on
the Chinese military. Conference participants
stressed the importance of demystifying
the Assassin’s Mace concept and further
improving our understanding of the term.
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*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. This conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s programs may be found on the Institute’s
Homepage at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ or by calling (717) 245-4212.
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